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THE NEED OF A CENTRAL BANK
By GEORGE E. ROBERTS,
President Commercial National Bank, Chicago, Ill.
The financial panic and general suspension of cash payments
by the banks of the United States, with the sudden paralysis of
business resulting therefrom, did more to convince the people of
the country that there were still serious defects in our currency
system than all the arguments to that effect that had ever been
made. Wall Street had been suffering from hard times since
early in the year, quotations for securities had been going down
but the prosperity of the country’s industries seemed to be un-
touched. No doubt it was inevitable that such conditions in the
security markets would eventually affect the industries, for when
stocks and bonds are unmarketable the supply of capital for new
enterprises is cut off. But a partial explanation for conditions in
Wall Street was to be found in the glut of securities which had
been poured out to support undertakings which are even yet uncom-
pleted. The fact is that no recession in business was observable
up to the date of the panic. The suspension of cash payments, the
consequent inability of employers to obtain money for pay-rolls,
the fright, and cancellation of orders, came on the general business
community like a stroke of lightning from a clear sky. Since then
few have disputed that currency reform is needed.
But there remains the difficult task of uniting public opinion
upon some plan. Broadly speaking, three policies are proposed.
First, a modification of our present system of bond-secured cur-
rency, by allowing, under a high tax, temporary, or emergency
issues upon miscellaneous bonds. Second, the plan adopted by
the American Bankers’ Association, or something similar, allowing
all national banks to issue credit notes against their general assets,
secured only by a common guaranty fund. Third, the establish-
ment of a central bank of large capital, which should exclusively
perform the function of issuing credit notes to meet the varying
needs of trade.
The first of these plans is confessedly a make-shift. Its advo-
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cates do not claim that it should be accepted as a finality, but only
that it is the best measure that can be enacted in the present un-
settled state of public opinion. It would be inoperative in an emer-
gency unless the banks set aside permanently a part of their re-
sources for that class of investments, as a measure of insurance.
They might do this, but it would be at a sacrifice of earning power,
and effect a corresponding curtailment of the banking capital
available for current use. Furthermore, the plan contemplate9
emergency issues solely, and there is no claim that they would be
responsive to the ordinary fluctuations of trade.
The second plan, offered by the American Bankers’ Associa-
tion, is more comprehensive, and contemplates a genuine credit
currency. It is, however, something of a compromise, the ,issues
being limited to forty per cent of a bank’s capital, and dependence
against over-issue is placed in part upon this restriction, in part
upon facilities for redemption and in part upon a graduated tax.
Without going into an extended discussion of this plan, it may be
said that it has never been tried under the conditions which exist
in the United States, and the very restrictions imposed add some-
thing to the uncertainties. The success of the plan would depend
upon the regularity and rapidity with which the notes were re-
deemed. The scheme itself contemplates that the self-interest of
the individual banks will prompt them to return the notes of all
other banks for redemption ; but that is a practical working detail,
the success of which, in view of the great number of banks outside
the system, cannot be positively foretold. The state banking insti-
tutions would have no interest in promoting redemptions, as they
are allowed to use the notes of nat:onal banks for reserves.
The first argument for a central bank is that such an institution,
organized into, and made a part of, our national banking system,
is needed to complete the latter, and all the more needed if im-
portant new powers as to currency issues are to be conferred upon
the individual banks. The defects and weakness of the national
system to-day are due to the isolation of, and lack of cohesion
among, the great number of scattered units. The recent crisis
has furnished ample demonstration of this. As a rule throughout
the interior the banks had their usual supply of currency, but they
restricted payments of cash, to the serious injury of business,
not so much from fear that money would be hoarded by the public,
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as from fear that it would not find its way back to the identical
banks that paid it freely. For example, a bank which had the
account of a railroad company might decline to supply money for
its pay-rolls, because the large sum thus taken from it would be
scattered along a thousand miles of line, and although it might
replenish the reserves of other banks, there was no probability
that any would come back to the original source. In like manner
the absence of leadership and of common policy in the granting
of credits resulted in a more precipitous contraction of these than
was necessary. If contraction and liquidation are to be the order
of things, everybody understands that there are certain advantages
in being among the first to act, and so a crisis is accentuated by a
disorganized scramble to force collections just when the interests
of the country require judicious liberality in the matter of credits.
If our banking system had at its head a strong institution, conserva-
tively managed, and able to support any critical situation, it would
practically make the policy of the whole system at such a time,
for the individual banks would not feel that they stood isolated and
alone and compelled to think only of self-preservation.
One result of the great number of small banks is that banking
is not a trained profession, although it deserves to be. The bank-
ers of the United States are a capable body of business men, but
they have generally drifted into banking from some other occupa-
tion, without education in what is entitled to be regarded as a
science-the science of the exchanges. No better proof of this is
needed than the fact that so many of them see no reason why the
notes of one bank should not be good in the reserves of another.
This fact, that so large a proportion of the bankers of the country,
although good judges of credits in their localities, and practically
successful in the ordinary routine of their business, are not familiar
with some of the fundamental principles of finance to which the
country as a whole must conform, is a substantial reason why the
national banking system should be surmounted by a supervisory
institution. It is true that we already have a system of supervision
through a public official, the Comptroller of the Currency, and there
is no intention here of criticizing the administration of that office
which has usually been very good and is ably conducted at the
present time. The Comptroller’s supervision is largely exercised
through his force of examiners, and the personnel of this force and
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the character of its work have been constantly improving as political
considerations have lost influence in the making of appointments.
Nevertheless, there is inevitably a degree of formality and rigidity
about such official supervision. The clearing-house associations of
the larger cities have found it advantageous to establish their own
system of examinations, and it is apparent that a central bank,
which was a part of the system, and to which the individual banks
were in the habit of applying for accommodations, would be able,
through its examiners and by the information constantly coming
to it through many channels, in the practical touch of business
relations, to exercise a most efflcacious and wholesome influence.
This supervision would be particularly desirable if the note-issuing
powers of the individual banks were to be enlarged. The central
bank with its branches would then serve as the redemption agency
through which the notes of the individual banks would be cleared
or redeemed and through which the most active, effective and
practical supervision of the note circulation would be maintained.
One of the features in which our banking system compares
unfavorably with those of foreign countries is in the control of the
interest rate. The natural and proper corrective of a tendency to
over-expansion is a rising interest rate. It exercises a repressive
influence, the pressure gradually increasing as the demand for
credit enlarges, until the rate becomes high enough to curtail ex-
pansion. Some borrowers who want accomodations at five per
cent will reduce their requirements when the rate reaches six, and
some who will see a profit in using money at six, will drop out
when the rate reaches seven. It is better to stop a runaway horse
by heading him up a hill than by running him into a stone wall.
In the one case he will get discouraged and slow down, while in
the other there will be a smash-up. Under the competitive condi-
tions which govern the banking business in the United States, the
banks are accustomed to lend money to their depositors at practi-
cally uniform rates as long as they can make loans at all, and then
abruptly shut down entirely. This is the smash-up policy. With
a gradually rising rate the business man will hold in check any
inclination to enlarge his liabilities and make an effort to reduce
them, and he will have time to do so. There is an enormous dif-
ference to him between being obliged to pay high rates and not
being able to get accommodations at all. By this policy the climax
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of a boom period is rounded over, expansion checked and contrac-
tion brought about without the shock which is unavoidable where
credit is supplied freely at a uniform rate until there is no loaning
power left to be used. The uniform rate in this country is due to
the competition of the banks for favor with depositors, and it is
useless to expect any other policy to be followed unless a strong
central bank becomes an important factor in the money market.
Such an institution would have reserve powers for making loans
after the individual banks were exhausted and when its aid was
called for it would have control of the rate.
The foreign state banks are able to exert an important influ-
ence upon the movement of gold by means of the interest rate, an
advance of the rate furnishing an inducement for the payment of
gold upon obligations due the bank, and a reduction serving to
relax its hold upon the metal. But even beyond this aid, in time
of crisis the credit notes of a central bank may be allowed to flow
out and take the place of gold in circulation, where the outgo of
the latter is imperatively required, thus saving the industries of
the country from shock. The Bank of France parts with important
sums of gold for the relief of other countries without reducing
the amount of its own notes in circulation, and hence without direct
influence upon trade in France. Indirectly it protects and benefits
conditions at home by helping to avert trouble in neighboring
countries with which France is intimately related. In this country
we lack the machinery for thus controlling the movement of gold
or protecting our industries from injury when the basis of our
system of credits is disturbed by conditions elsewhere.
The system of independent banks without a central organiza-
tion is costly to the country in requiring an unnecessarily large gold
reserve. In this respect the United States makes an especially
poor showing of efficiency compared with Great Britain and a poor
showing even when compared with the continental countries. The
gold reserve of England is practically all in the Bank of England,
and at the present writing is about $165,ooo.,ooo. This is the
capital by means of which the gold standard is maintained, and upon
which the credits of the country rest, as other banks use Bank of
England notes for their reserves. In the United States we have
about $900,000,000 of gold in the treasury and some $230,000,000
or $300,000,000 in the banks. If this vast store of gold made
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credits in this country more stable and secure than in England,
there might be a valid argumeht for it, but our system has practi-
cally broken down twice in the last fifteen years, while a general
suspension of cash payments in England is unknown. This gold
reserve is a part of the country’s capital, and the interest on it is
a part of the cost of doing business in this country as truly as are
our transportation charges. If the latter were higher than in
foreign countries there would be great agitation about it. An
examination of the situation in every other country will show that
a central bank can be made to conserve and protect the gold
reserves of a country and accomplish an important economy in this
respect.
There is strong support for the central bank as a medium for
the issue of an elastic currency in the experience and conclusions
of foreign countries. One by one all of the other important
countries of the world have adopted it. Even Switzerland, which
had been served by twenty-six well-managed banks of issue, and
where regulation by reason of the small area over which they were
located, would seem to have been comparatively simple, in 1905
established a central bank to take over the function of issue. By
centralizing the issues in one strong establishment, which in its
organization is made a semi-official institution, this important func-
tion is performed not only immediately under the eye and with
the participation of the government, but with complete publicity
and subject to the criticism of the entire financial world. The
weekly statements of the great state banks of foreign countries
are scrutinized by the press and by economists, bankers, and critics
of the whole world. Manifestly these conditions are radically
different from those surrounding note issues by thousands of indi-
vidual and unrelated banks scattered over such a country as the
United States.
The central bank could amply meet the needs of every part of
the country by rediscounting the bills receivable of local banks or
loaning upon such collateral. The notes issued in making these
loans would have behind them, first, the original borrowers ; second,
the endorsement of the local bank, and third, the responsibility
of the central institution. The latter should have authority to
examine local banks applying for loans, and by so doing would
serve as an additional supervising authority over them and exert
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a most salutary influence upon the whole banking situation. When
fully organized the bank should have a dozen or so offices located
in the more important cities of the different parts of the country,
in order to be convenient of access for the local banks of all sec-
tions. Instead of being adapted only for times of panic, like most
of the plans now offered, this system of note issues would be
useful at all times and serve to equalize interest rates over them
different seasons of the year, and to some extent over the different
sections of the country. The notes of the central bank should
gradually become an important part of the common circulating
medium of the country, eventually taking the place of the present
national bank circulation as the public debt is retired and increasing
in volume with the growth of the country. They would be a more
economical medium of exchange for the country than gold or gold
certificates. They would not, like a recognized emergency currency,
be in themselves a sign and symptom of financial trouble. As soon
as country bankers were accustomed to the regular practice of redis-
counting currency bills receivable and it became recognized as a per-
fectly legitimate method of aiding local customers, instead of being
regarded as discreditable, the central institution would prove itself
to be of great service to every part of the country, and particularly
to those sections which produce the great agricultural staples but
lack the free capital to handle them every year. They can furnish
unquestionable security and the central bank could supply all the
currency needed.
Let it be supposed that the capital of the central organization
was fixed at $100,000,000. That would be only about I per cent
of the capital of the banks in the national system, and of course
the amount for them to raise would be much reduced if state banks
were permitted to become shareholders. This capital might be in-
vested in high-class bonds, as in the case of the Bank of France,
thus serving simpjy as a guaranty fund. The central organization
might then issue its notes for say $300,000,000, and through its
constituent institutions exchange these for gold or gold certificates,
thus establishing its gold reserve. If, now, it was authorized to issue
notes upon the single condition that it should always keep a reserve
equal to 3311, per cent of the amount outstanding, it would have
the capacity to put out $600,000,000 of uncovered notes. This
would be the measure of elasticity obtainable upon a reserve of
I I
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$300,000,000. It might take some time to acquire that reserve,
but as the stock of gold in the country increased, and as the central
institution became in fact the recognized custodian of the country’s
reserves, it would become greater. A part of this note-issuing
capacity could be in current use. In time it might acquire almost
a monopoly of certain classes of commercial paper, notably that
based upon staple commodities and secured by public warehouse
receipts. It is in the annual movement of this class of commodities
that the greatest fluctuations in the demand for money occurs, and
the greatest need for elasticity is felt. The central institution
could finance the movement for local banks without any disturbance
to the money markets, and upon terms that would effect a saving
to the producers. When the crop movement was over, and the
loans based on the moving product were paid, the bank would be
back to a liquidated condition and ready to expand again as its
assistance was needed. With its power of note issue it would be
able to liquidate any of its constituent institutions that required
help. The method by which clearing-house certificates and checks
were issued during the late crisis affords a complete illustration
of the operations of such a system.
The usual objections to a central bank can be met in the organi-
zation. The opposing arguments in this country are usually based
upon the experience of the old Bank of the United States and the
political controversy which developed it. That bank was under
strictly private management, entered into active competition with all
state and private banks, and as the latter held no relation to it but
that of competitors, it was not strange that opposition was fostered.
Clearly, another central bank, if established, should be organized
into the national banking system and be a part of it. The capital
should be furnished by the individual banks and it should do busi-
ness only with them. The stockholders should be represented in the
management by 4 board of directors elected by territorial districts.
By this system every section of the country would be represented on
the board and likewise all shades of political opinion. The govern-
ment should be represented in the control of the bank by the prin-
cipal officers of the Treasury Department. The plan of the Bank of
Germany where there are two boards, one chosen by the stock-
holders and one appointed by the government, has worked satisfac-
torily there. The combination of government authority with the
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practical advantages that inhere in private ownership and manage-
ment is thus secured. With such an organization, and the publicity
that is necessarily given to the conduct of such an institution, the
probability that it will be used to promote private or partisan inter-
ests is too remote to be seriously considered. The executive officers
should be elected by the stockholders’ board, but subject to approval
by the government directors. The experience elsewhere is that
trained bankers of known ability and the highest character are
chosen.
Finally, all other plans for reforming our monetary system leave
the relations of the United States Treasury to the money market
precisely what they have been, and this furnishes one of the strongest
reasons for preferring the central bank plan. In all other countries
the receipts and disbursements of the treasury are handled by these
institutions. The revenues go directly into the bank, the payments
are checked out of it, and whatever surplus there may be remains
in the bank, like any individual or corporate balance, subject to
commercial use. With our independent treasury any surplus of
revenues over expenditures remains in the vaults of the treasury
until the Secretary volunteers, in his discretion, to deposit it in such
national banks as he may select. During the fiscal year ended June
30, 1907, the government’s revenue exceeded disbursements by the
enormous sum of $87,000,000, and in order that this drain might
not paralyze industry throughout the country, it was necessary for
the Secretary to make deposits in this amount. The transactions
of the treasury are increasing every year with the growth of the
country, and the discrepancy between receipts and disbursements
may reach very large figures. It is important that these sums be
kept in circulation, but highly desirable that they be handled and
distributed by an automatic system instead of by the voluntary and
arbitrary action of the Secretary of the Treasury. The determina-
tion of when deposits shall be made, and in what cities and banks
they shall be made, inevitably involves that official in the most un-
pleasant kind of criticism, and he should be relieved from it entirely
by the adoption of a different system. At this writing the treasury
deposits amount to about $250,000,000, scattered in 1,250 banks.
During the last two months of r907 the declining revenue receipts
made it necessary for the treasury to replenish the working balances
in its offices, but with financial conditions in a state of intense strain
, - ..,
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it was impracticable to draw on the deposits and an issue of certi-
cates of indebtedness was forced.
When all considerations are brought into the account it is
found that a central bank answers the demands more completely
than any other plan proposed. It is comprehensive and final, while
other plans are incomplete and temporary. It is in harmony with
the development of the times toward higher organization, and it
has the advantage of being a working success elsewhere.
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